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In my essay, I will argue that evolution does not undermine naturalism. This 
is because Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism rests 
on a false and unmotivated premise and is thus invalid. My argument 
consists of two parts: 
In the expository part, I outline Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against 
naturalism in considerable detail (section 2). 
In the argumentative part, I firstly pose William Ramsey’s challenge to 
Plantinga’s probabilistic claim that the reliability of human cognitive 
faculties is low and critically examine Plantinga’s response in order to 
reinforce it (section 3). Secondly, I attack Plantinga’s understanding of 
human evolution, which motivates his cognitive skepticism, as being unduly 




2. Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EEAN) 
 
In chapter 12 of his Warrant and Proper Function (1993: 216-37), Alvin 
Plantinga puts forward an evolutionary argument against naturalism 
(hereafter EEAN). If valid, EEAN shows that to subscribe to both 
naturalism and evolutionary theory is irrational or self-defeating.  
Thereby, naturalism (hereafter simply N) means the metaphysical view that 
there exist only spatiotemporal entities. Thus, N denies the existence of 
disembodied minds, ghosts or deities, and, most importantly, the Christian 
God (cf. Fales 2002: 43). Evolutionary theory or Neo-Darwinism (hereafter 
simply E), on the other hand, is the biological thesis that human beings have 
evolved through random mutation, genetic transmission of traits and natural 
selection from primitive life forms (cf. Fales 2002: 44).  
 
The three following claims serve as premises to the conclusion that the 
conjunction of N and E is irrational or self-defeating:1 
 
(1) Probability Thesis: the probability that human cognitive faculties are 
reliable, i.e. produce mostly true beliefs in ordinary conditions, is either low 
or inscrutable given N and E. Put more technically, P(R/N&E) is low or 
inscrutable, where R stands for the proposition that human cognitive 
faculties are reliable.  
(2) Defeater Thesis: If some subject S accepts N&E and (1), she has a 
defeater for her belief in R. 
(3) Self-Defeater Thesis: If S has a defeater for R, she has a defeater for all 
of her beliefs, one of which is N&E. 
                                                
1 Here, I follow roughly James Beilby’s (2002: viii) reconstruction of EEAN. 
 4 
Let me comment on them in turn. 
 
The probability thesis arises from what Plantinga calls (referring to a letter 
by Darwin to William Graham in 1881) ‘Darwin’s doubt’. Darwin’s doubt 
is the worry that, following evolutionary naturalism, the ultimate purpose or 
function of cognitive faculties will be something like survival, rather than 
true belief. Put succinctly, in Plantinga’s words, ‘evolution is interested, not 
in true belief, but in survival or fitness’ (Plantinga 1993: 219). Or, more 
formally, Darwin’s doubt insinuates that P(R/N&E) is low.  
In order to substantiate Darwin’s doubt, Plantinga goes on to devise a series 
of hypothetical scenarios (featuring populations of human-like creatures on 
an Earth-like planet), in which true belief plays no or no significant role in 
evolution.2 Most relevantly, there is the possibility of beliefs’ being causally 
connected to behavior, fitness-enhancing or adaptive, yet wildly false. Truth 
and survival value can come apart. To illustrate his point, Plantinga 
develops the following scenario:  
‘Paul is a prehistoric hominid; the exigencies of survival call for him to 
display tiger-avoidance behavior. There will be many behaviors that are 
appropriate: fleeing, for example, or climbing a steep rock face… […] Pick 
any such appropriately specific behavior B. Paul engages in B, we think, 
because, sensible fellow that he is, he has an aversion to being eaten and 
believes that B is good means of thwarting the tiger’s intentions. But clearly 
this avoidance behavior could be a result of a thousand other belief-desire 
combinations: indefinitely many other belief-desire systems fit B equally 
well. […] Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but 
whenever he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, 
because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him.  This will get 
his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without 
involving much by way of true belief.’ (Plantinga 1993: 225) 
 
                                                
2 Among the variables are causal efficaciousness, content, survival-advantage (i.e. 
adaptiveness) and truth (cf. Plantinga 1993: 223ff. ; see also Fales 2002: 47f.). For the 
purposes of my essay, I only discuss the scenario most important to naturalists, namely 
false, yet adaptive beliefs. 
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The moral of the scenario is straightforward: adaptive belief need not 
necessarily be true. Truth is no necessary condition for adaptiveness. Put 
differently, Paul’s adaptive behavior is essentially underdetermined in 
regard to the truth or falsity of the beliefs that cause it. False beliefs can be 
perfectly adaptive too. This, however, makes it improbable that our 
cognitive faculties, which were naturally selected for, are reliable. 
Therefore, P(R/N&E) is low. 
Plantinga concedes that the argument is by no means irresistible. Instead, 
the sensible course might be agnosticism: one does simply not know 
whether P(R/N&E) is low or not. In that case, one should withhold belief 
altogether (Plantinga 1993: 231). 
Most plausibly, however, is a disjunction of the two: P(R/N&E) is either 
low, as intimated by the scenario above, or inscrutable, as agnosticism 
would have it. Thus, in sum, we get the probability thesis: P(R/N&E) is 
either low or inscrutable. 
 
The defeater thesis claims that whenever some subject S accepts N&E and 
the probability thesis, she has a defeater for her belief in R. Something 
qualifies as a defeater D for proposition B in case it meets the following 
condition: If S continues to believe B despite believing D, then S is 
irrational (cf. Plantinga 1993: 40f.). Basically, there are two types of 
defeaters: whereas rebutting defeaters defeat B by being a reason to believe 
not-B, undercutting defeaters defeat B by being a reason to doubt the 
trustworthiness of B’s very source (cf. ibid.). The defeater thesis features an 
undercutting defeater: N&E together with (1) undercut the belief in R. Not 
only is it irrational to continue believing in R, but also is it irrational to trust 
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in R’s source, namely one’s cognitive faculties (cf. Plantinga 1993: 231). 
The self-defeater thesis follows from the defeater thesis: once the reliability 
of human cognitive faculties is undermined, it is irrational to believe in 
anything these faculties produce, including N&E. After all, N&E proves to 
be self-defeating. 
Thus, (1)-(3) jointly imply that holding N&E is irrational. 
 
However, why is it an argument against N, instead of N&E? This is because 
Plantinga thinks that N is less plausible than E, and thus has to give in order 
for S to avoid being irrational. Moreover, Plantinga holds that theism should 
replace N, since it circumnavigates the trouble N faces. Theism (hereafter T) 
is the view that there is a supernatural being or deity like the Christian God. 
According to T, there is no reason for doubting that it is a purpose of our 
cognitive systems to produce true beliefs (cf. Plantinga 1993: 236). The 
form of E that T may endorse is one guided by God, who is omniscient and 
has created us human beings in His infallible epistemic image, i.e. has 
endowed us with a reflection of His powers as a knower (cf. ibid.). 
Therefore, given T&E, P(R) is comparably high. In sum, we have EEAN: an 
argument from E against N. Put differently, evolution undermines 
naturalism. Thereby, EEAN does not argue for the falsehood of N and the 
truth of T. Rather, it’s an argument for the conclusion that, given E, 
accepting N is irrational. N could still be true, yet not rationally acceptable 
(cf. Plantinga 1993: 235).  
 
In the remainder of my essay, I will focus on the plausibility of the 
probability thesis. In section 3, I will critically examine whether Plantinga 
meets a challenge posed to the evolutionary scenario cited above. In section 
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4, I will attack the understanding of evolutionary theory that underlies 




3. Ramsey’s Challenge Reinforced 
 
In this section, I will present a challenge posed to Plantinga’s probability 
thesis by William Ramsey (2002)3 and critically examine Plantinga’s (2002) 
response in order to reinforce it.  
 
According to Evan Fales (2002: 47), the best strategy for a naturalist against 
EEAN amounts to arguing that the probability thesis is false. This would 
render EEAN invalid.4 Ramsey does exactly that by issuing a challenge to 
Plantinga’s scenario cited above (cf. Ramsey 2002: 20f.). He concedes that 
the scenario may illustrate the fact that there’s a huge array of possible false 
belief-desire pairs that would generate a given bit of adaptive behavior on a 
particular occasion. However, it does little to show that natural selection is 
likely to generate cognitive mechanisms that are systematically unreliable 
but somehow prove adaptive. Instead, Plantinga puts forth random instances 
‘…in which erroneous thinking happens to prove lucky for the cognitive 
agent’ (Ramsey 2002: 20). Moreover, Plantinga’s scenario is clearly 
maladaptive: it would not work in the long run. Thus, Ramsey’s challenge 
questions whether Plantinga can provide an evolutionary scenario in which 
beliefs are systematically false yet still adaptive. If it cannot be met, we 
have reason to believe that the probability thesis is mistaken: in fact, 
P(R/N&E) is high. 
 
                                                
3 Evan Fales (2002: 50f.) issues nearly the same challenge, but motivates it differently. 
4 Note that, by doing so, one attacks both disjuncts: P(R/N&E) is high and thus, trivially, 
not inscrutable. 
 9 
Plantinga’s response to Ramsey’s challenge (cf. Plantinga 2002: 258ff.) 
consists of two steps: accusing Ramsey of a conflation and, more 
interestingly, putting forward an allegedly adequate evolutionary scenario. 
Firstly, Plantinga contends that Ramsey conflates two different kinds of 
mental representation, namely indicator representations and beliefs. 
Indicator representations operate in football players trying to evade 
tacklers, for instance, or, more instructively, in mercury thermometers.5 In 
such thermometers, a certain height of the mercury column can be said to 
indicate or ‘represent’ a certain temperature (cf. Plantinga 2002: 259). 
Therefore, indicator representations have indicator content, e.g. the 
temperature the thermometer indicates or represents. Further, indicator 
representations can have accuracy: an indicator representation is accurate if 
the state that it is in is the one with which it is correlated, e.g. the ambient 
temperature (cf. ibid.). Such representations will therefore be trivially 
accurate: if they represent at all, they do it accurately. However, indicator 
representations are a long shot from genuine, full-fledged belief. Therefore, 
‘…none of this, so far, has anything to do with belief, or with the truth of a 
belief’ (ibid.).  
In contrast, beliefs have propositional content and are therefore truth-apt, i.e. 
they can be either true or false. By no means they are simply trivially true. 
Rather, they can misrepresent and thus be false. Thus, they differ crucially 
from indicator representations (cf. Plantinga 2002: 264). 
Now, Ramsey’s challenge seems to involve indicator representations, not 
beliefs. Since indicator representations are trivially accurate, though, the 
                                                
5 Of course, Plantinga does not hold that thermometers have mental indicator 
representations. Thermometers are chosen for their heuristic value only, since they 
resemble the brain mechanisms that indicate and regulate human body temperature. 
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challenge does not arise in the first place. No sensible anti-naturalist would 
argue that indicator representations do not get naturally selected for their 
accuracy (cf. Plantinga 2002: 259). For beliefs, however, Ramsey’s 
challenge can easily be met. This leads us to the second step of Plantinga’s 
response. 
Secondly, Plantinga envisions an evolutionary scenario, which features 
entire systems of mainly false, yet adaptive beliefs. It runs as follows (cf. 
Plantinga 2002: 260):  
Many naturalists6 hold that religious belief is, although false, adaptive. 
Now, imagine a tribe of cognitively gifted creatures, which believe that 
everything (except God Himself) has been created by God and is thus a 
creature. Furthermore, they refer to the various things in their environment 
only by way of such definite descriptions as ‘the tree creature before me’. 
Additionally, all their beliefs are properly expressed by singular sentences 
whose subjects are definite descriptions expressing properties that entail the 
property of creaturehood. That means their beliefs are expressed by 
sentences such as ‘the tiger creature approaching me is dangerous’. Finally, 
their definite descriptions are Russellian: ‘The fastest man in New Orleans 
is a wide receiver for the Saints’, e.g., translates into ‘There’s exactly one 
fastest man in New Orleans, and he is a wide receivers for the Saints’. Then, 
from a naturalist perspective, all of the tribe’s beliefs are false. Yet, they can 
still be adaptive as long as they ascribe the right properties (e.g. being 
dangerous) to the right creatures. Thus, quite ironically, religious belief, 
properly modified, meets Ramsey’s challenge: it is systematically false yet 
                                                
6 Here, Plantinga has in mind the sociobiologist E.O. Wilson and the philosopher Michael 
Wilson, although anyone committed to both N and E and trying to explicate religion in 
biological terms would presumably qualify. 
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adaptive. After all, truth does not matter for adaptiveness. The probability 
thesis is true. 
 
In my view, however, Plantinga’s response is crucially flawed. More 
specifically, Plantinga’s scenario fails to show that truth is not necessary for 
adaptive belief. In order to see that, one has to ask what parts or logical 
constituents of the tribe’s beliefs (given that they have the form of 
Russellian definite descriptions) actually make them adaptive.7 The answer 
for a belief such as the one expressed by ‘the tiger creature approaching me 
is dangerous’ is straightforward: it is not the false religious belief-
constituent that everything is a creature. Rather, it is the true belief-
constituents that certain creatures like tigers are e.g. approaching and 
dangerous. Although the whole Russellian definite description, as complex, 
conjunctive quantification, and thus the belief as such is false, the 
constituents relevant for the belief’s adaptiveness are true.8 A simple 
thought-experiment underscores my point: imagine a tribe-member, Mary, 
who turned atheist and thus lost the false religious belief that everything had 
been created by God. Would the belief expressed by ‘the tiger creature 
approaching me is dangerous’ be any more adaptive – ceteri paribus – than 
the belief expressed by ‘the tiger approaching me is dangerous’? 
Presumably not.9 What matters alone is that atheist Mary still truly believes 
                                                
7 That the tribe’s beliefs have constituent structure seems to follow from their being best 
expressed by definite descriptions. However, nothing in my argument turns on this point.  
8 Put formally, the belief has the following logical structure: ∃x(Cx ∧ Axm ∧ ∀y(Cy ∧ 
Aym → y=x) ∧ Dx), where Cx stands for the predicate ‘x is a tiger creature’, Dx for ‘x is 
dangerous’ and Axm for the relation ‘x approaching me’, etc.. My claim is that Axm and 
Dx, which are both truly predicated of the tiger, and not Cx, which is falsely predicated, are 
relevant for the belief’s adaptiveness. 
9 Above, Plantinga implicitly concedes that by claiming that the tribe’s false religious 
beliefs prove adaptive as long as they ‘…ascribe the right properties to the right ‘creatures’’ 
(Plantinga 1993: 260).  
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that an approaching tiger is dangerous and that she acts upon that belief. The 
false religious belief that everything is a creature does not have any 
influence on the adaptiveness of her beliefs and behavior whatsoever. 
Consequently, after all, truth does matter for the adaptiveness of belief. 
Plantinga’s response cannot meet Ramsey’s challenge.  
Eventually, Plantinga’s fallacy appears to stem from a misinterpretation of 
the naturalist claim that religious belief is adaptive, which serves as an 
assumption in Plantinga’s story. By it, naturalists do probably not mean that 
religious beliefs are adaptive on an individual level, e.g. by changing an 
individual’s perception of the environment, as in Plantinga’s scenario.10 
Rather, religious belief works more subtly: it increases group cohesion, thus 
fostering cooperation, which in turn proves adaptive. Put differently, 
religious belief works as a group-adaptation (cf. D.S. Wilson 2002). Thus, 
false religious belief can be adaptive, after all, but on a collective level. 
Plantinga’s scenario overlooks this possibility and thus misinterprets the 
naturalist claim. Yet, even if Plantinga interpreted it correctly in its 
collective sense, the naturalist claim would not help him to meet Ramsey’s 
challenge. This is because true beliefs about the environment make sure that 
individual prehistoric hominids like Paul or Mary survive another day in a 
world of dangerous tigers, regardless of whether they hold false religious 
beliefs that prove collectively adaptive.  
In conclusion, Ramsey’s challenge still stands tall, even somewhat taller. 
This, however, gives us reason to believe that the probability thesis is false. 
                                                
10 The idea that evolution works on different levels is standard in contemporary 
evolutionary theory (cf. Okasha 2003: 699). 
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4. An Argument from Cultural Evolution 
 
In this section, I sketch out an argument from cultural evolution. It aims at 
showing that the probability thesis is unmotivated, as it rests on an unduly 
narrow understanding of human evolution. Since such an argument has not 
been put forward previously, I do not expect it to be perfectly cogent and 
compelling. Rather, it provides some considerations, informed by cutting-
edge empirical research on human evolution, which add a further critical 
dimension to EEAN. 
 
Mainly, I claim that Plantinga’s EEAN, and especially the probability 
thesis, turn on an understanding of human evolution that neglects the role of 
culture and cultural evolution, as opposed to nature and natural evolution. 
This renders it unduly narrow. For in recent biological anthropology and 
evolutionary theory, the consensus has emerged that culture is a second 
major force in human evolution (cf. Van Schaik 2007: 112), ‘leading to 
evolutionary processes that are every bit as real and important as those that 
shape genetic variation’ (Boyd & Richerson 2005: 4). Even more 
dramatically, culture is what makes us distinctively human: ‘Culture […] 
may well have been the essential ingredient that set us on the way toward 
humanity’ (Van Schaik 2007: 111).  
Thereby, culture is conceived broadly as a special kind of information: it is 
both causally efficacious on individuals’ behavior and acquired from 
members of one’s species through various forms of social transmission (e.g. 
teaching, imitation) (cf. Boyd & Richerson 2005: 5). More precisely, 
information means any kind of mental state which meets such criteria, 
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whether that be beliefs, abilities, skills, knowledge or even moral values (cf. 
ibid.).  
 
Culture bears on EEAN in that it helps us address and undermine the 
implicit motivation behind Plantinga’s probability thesis. For Plantinga, 
what is essentially wrong about evolution is its ‘blindness’ or lack of 
‘guidance’ (Plantinga 1993: 217, 236). It is opportunistic and thus solely 
cares about short-term survival. Its focus on adaptiveness, instead of, say, 
truth, translates into Plantinga’s skeptical worry about the reliability of 
human cognitive faculties. Thereby, naturalism, with its inherent atheism, 
fails to remedy the shortcoming: it proposes no telos of evolution. Only 
theism can, according to which ‘evolution [is] guided and orchestrated by 
God’ (Plantinga 1993: 236), who has created us human beings in His 
infallible epistemic image. After all, it is Christian faith that rescues theists 
like Plantinga from Hume’s skeptical loops or the famous game of 
backgammon (cf. ibid.).  
However, given cultural evolution, Plantinga’s horror vacui might be 
unfounded and, consequently, his probability thesis unmotivated. Cultural 
evolution, in contrast to natural evolution, allows for guidance, if only for 
guidance by (primitive) human beings. This is because culture features so-
called ‘guided variation’ among its evolutionary forces (cf. Boyd & 
Richerson 2005: 69, 115f.). Basically, guided variation means that 
individuals ‘may modify existing beliefs, or even invent completely new 
ones, as a result of their experiences’ (Boyd & Richerson 2005: 115). Such 
innovations are subsequently transmitted socially and thus gain the status of 
a cultural practice. Just consider how prehistoric hominids discovered the 
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use of fire. Or, consider, as cultural evolution went on, how Homer’s 
Odyssey set the artistic standard of epic poetry for centuries to come. 
Therefore, cultural evolution contains an undeniable element of 
intentionality, in contrast to random genetic variation, which features 
prominently in natural evolution. Consequently, evolution, properly 
understood as including both nature and culture, does not lack guidance 
altogether. Evolution is not blind, but sees through the eyes of culture.11 
                                                
11 Of course, I do not want to argue that guided variation is sufficient for ensuring the 
reliability of human cognitive faculties. However, it is known that culture promotes 
intelligence (cf. Van Schaik 2006: 66), and intelligence, arguably, might get a species a 





In this essay, I have argued that evolution does not undermine naturalism. 
Plantinga’s EEAN turns on a premise, namely the probability thesis, which 
is both false and unmotivated.  
On one hand, it is false because of Plantinga’s inability to provide the 
naturalist with an evolutionary scenario in which systematically false belief 
proves adaptive. After all, truth seems to be necessary for adaptive belief, at 
least for individually adaptive belief, which is solely relevant in the context 
of EEAN. 
On the other hand, the probability thesis is unmotivated since its motivation 
derives from an unduly narrow understanding of human evolution. Natural 
evolution does not exhaust human evolution. Rather, culture plays a 
significant role as well. Culture, in contrast to natural evolution, allows for 
individual innovation and thus makes human evolution not as ‘blind’ and 
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